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5The NHS faces an unprecedented period of
economic constraint. Even the most optimistic 
of funding scenarios suggests that the NHS in
England will have to achieve a step change in
productivity. It is unlikely that increased technical
efficiency will be enough to bridge the gap
between demand for care and the funding
available. The key will be to ensure allocative
efficiency across the whole range of NHS
spending and deliver value for money by doing
less of some things and more of others. This 
will require commissioners to focus not just on
new growth money, as has often occurred in 
the past, but to assess and prioritise the total
budget available and to focus not on institutions
but on the outcomes achieved across the whole
pathway of care.
It is now nearly two decades since the
introduction of a separation between purchasers
and providers in the NHS, yet capacity to deliver
on the ambition of commissioning is still lacking.
It is often suggested that if only commissioning
were to be ‘strong’ or ‘world class’, more progress
would be made in areas such as moving care out
of hospital into the community, or gaining greater
productivity from health care providers. Initiatives
such as the World Class Commissioning and
Practice-based Commissioning have been put 
in place to attempt to improve the quality of
commissioning across the NHS.
Ensuring value for money is more critical than
ever. It is important that the NHS is clear how
commissioning will help deliver this, particularly
where it may have previously failed to do so. This
report, published jointly by The Nuffield Trust
and The King’s Fund, examines the development
of NHS commissioning and sets out practical
suggestions for how it might be strengthened to
secure more effective and efficient care.
This report, together with a companion volume
Where Next for Integrated Care Organisations in 
the English NHS? builds on previous work by
researchers at both organisations. We hope that
the combined efforts of our organisations will
contribute to the debate about how the NHS
should evolve to meet the pressing challenges 
that our health system faces. 
Dr Jennifer Dixon
Director, The Nuffield Trust
Dr Anna Dixon
Acting Chief Executive, The King’s Fund
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6Commissioning in the English NHS is subject 
to apparently endless debate and frequent
criticism. The discourse would have us believe
that if only commissioning were to be ‘strong’,
‘world class’ or ‘effective’, long-awaited 
changes could occur such as more care in
community settings, reconfigured hospital
services, and a more productive and 
cost-efficient health system.
In this report, we focus on what needs to be 
done to strengthen commissioning in the NHS,
through an analysis of the problems with current
commissioning arrangements. We begin by
examining what is meant by ‘commissioning’ in
the English NHS.
What do we mean by
commissioning?
‘Commissioning’ in the NHS is where an
organisation, and/or a group of clinicians, acts 
on behalf of a population to decide which 
health services to buy, using tax funds allocated
by the Department of Health according to a
formula based on health needs. It entails 
decision-making about needs assessment,
resource allocation, service purchasing,
monitoring and review. 
What are the current arrangements
for commissioning in the NHS?
Commissioning of local health services takes 
place through two main routes: first, via primary
care trusts (PCTs) who are responsible for using
public money for commissioning a range 
of health services, primary, community, 
secondary and tertiary care. In carrying out 
their commissioning role, PCTs work with
partners such as local authorities (to plan 
and purchase services such as mental 
healthcare), other PCTs (in networks or 
consortia for specialised services) and primary
care clinicians. 
It is the commissioning of care with primary 
care clinicians (mainly GPs) that forms the 
second main route for commissioning in 
the NHS – practice-based commissioning. 
This is a form of primary care-led purchasing
where PCTs allocate to practices a notional 
(not real) budget that can be used for
commissioning community- and hospital-based
services to meet the needs of the practices’
enrolled population. Practices typically group
together in consortia for their commissioning
work and some are established as companies 
or social enterprises.
This all adds up to a complex set of
commissioning arrangements in any one local
area, with commissioning happening at a 
regional or national level for specialised 
services, through the PCT and local authority 
for the majority of care, and via various 
practice-based commissioning consortia for
community-focused care. In this report we 
show this as a local commissioning continuum 
or matrix.
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What are the problems with
current commissioning
arrangements?
We examine the problems with current
commissioning arrangements from two
perspectives: problems related directly to PCTs
and practice-based commissioning policy; and
those related to the wider features of the NHS.
Problems related directly to PCTs and
practice-based commissioning policy
 PCTs have little control over the volume of
referrals made by GPs and hospital doctors, and
this is further compounded by patients having a
free choice of provider. Referral management
centres are one way in which PCTs can gain better
information and some influence over referrals.
 PCTs currently combine both provider and
commissioner functions, and observers disagree
about whether this is a benefit or not. Current
policy is forcing a separation of functions
between PCTs and provider agencies.
 NHS commissioning bodies (PCTs and their
predecessor bodies) have experienced
numerous imposed reorganisations that have
impeded their progress.
 PCTs have limited autonomy compared with
NHS trusts and foundation trusts, which
arguably makes them more risk-averse.
 Clinical leadership and engagement in PCTs is
typically weaker than in provider counterparts.
Practice-based commissioning has gone some
way towards addressing this, but remains
patchy in its progress across the NHS.
 PCTs are poorly understood by the general
public, and accountability to their local
population is relatively weak.
 Capability and capacity for commissioning are
key concerns for PCT and practice-based
commissioning. The ‘World Class
Commissioning’ (WCC) initiative is a national
effort to develop skills and capacity, and there 
is some evidence of progress.
 Analysis of data and information is an area 
of particular concern in respect of
commissioning capacity.
 The incentives for GPs to engage in active
practice-based commissioning are weak. 
 Hospital doctors are not involved enough in
providing specialist advice to practice-based
commissioners.
 The lack of real budgets for practice-based
commissioners reduces the impact that they can
have in relation to extending service provision
and commissioning new forms of care.
Problems related to the wider features 
of the NHS
 Incentives for commissioners to improve
quality and reduce costs of provision are not
sufficiently strong, although regulation of
commissioning is being developed further and
this, together with a tight financial context, is
likely to sharpen such incentives.
 PCTs are weaker organisations than provider
trusts and foundation trusts. There are a
number of reasons for this, both historical and
related to current system reform mechanisms.
 The current NHS payment regime hampers the
ability of commissioners to undertake more
effective and challenging strategic purchasing,
especially in relation to trying to shift care out
of hospitals.
The verdict on commissioning 
to date
Commissioners have helped to implement
numerous national plans, service strategies and
8access/performance targets. Practice-based
commissioning has prompted the growth of
extended primary care services, and other areas 
of commissioning, such as specialised services,
which work well. It is, however, questionable as
to how far such achievements are directly a result
of commissioners, rather than national direction
and performance management. More
disappointing is that there is still much to be done
to bring about desired shifts of care out of
hospitals and into community settings. 
What is needed is a significant prompt towards
care being orientated towards the needs of
patients to stay well, much greater encouragement
for clinicians to take responsibility for managing
resources, and a huge advance by commissioners
in the exploitation of patient-level information on
costs, quality and service use.
What needs to be done?
Addressing problems related to PCTs and
practice-based commissioning policy
 Incentivise GPs beyond practice-based
commissioning: this could be achieved by
granting real, risk-adjusted and capitated
budgets to groups of GPs, in return for them
assuming responsibility for financial risk and
the health outcomes of the local population.
 Recognise that clinical commissioning groups need
to be larger: to attract skilled management
capacity, handle financial risk, and have ‘clout’
in the local healthcare system.
 Practice-based commissioning needs ultimately to
include hospital clinicians: thus becoming a form
of multi-specialty group or integrated care
organisation. How this might work was
explored in a Nuffield Trust/NHS Alliance
report (Smith and others, 2009) and is
examined further in the second report in this
series (Lewis and others, 2010).
 Allow PCTs to become fewer and larger: with 
their role increasingly becoming that of the
designer and manager of the local
commissioning continuum, and the allocator 
of budgets to clinical commissioning
organisations, specialised commissioning
networks and so forth.
 Strengthen the accountability of commissioners:
including having elected health boards/PCTs,
extending foundation trust status to
commissioning organisations, and offering
people a direct choice of commissioner.
 Allow commissioners more financial flexibility:
such as being able to retain surpluses 
and invest across different years, 
and hence increase bargaining power 
with providers.
Addressing problems related to the wider
features of the NHS 
 Reform elements of the payment by results regime:
in particular, in relation to more ‘unbundling’ 
of the tariff and extending it to cover more
community and other services.
 Assume risk-adjusted capitated budgets are the
future: these will be the currency if integrated
provider–commissioner organisations develop.
It may then be that the financial currency
locally within the integrated care organisation is
not a nationally set service tariff, but locally
agreed prices.
 Accept that there is no one optimal model of
commissioning, but a continuum. The 
challenge for PCTs is how best to design 
and operate that continuum at a local level,
while nurturing stonger devolved extended
clinical commissioning organisations.
 Explain to the public more of what commissioning is.
There is a need to create a clear and compelling
narrative about the role and importance of
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commissioning, both for the public and for staff
in the NHS. This is critical if we are to move
beyond the current (arguably unfair) narrative
of commissioning as inevitably and seemingly
irrevocably weak.
Going forward
We suggest that the health system is now at a
fork in the road. On the one hand, the NHS
could continue with minor changes to develop
commissioning largely using the existing
arrangements. But this would lose time. On the
other, there is an option of pushing forward 
with a more radical model of clinician-led
healthcare provision and commissioning (see
Lewis and others, 2010), as part of an overall
strengthened continuum of commissioning
arrangements designed and held to account by
fewer and larger PCTs. 
This more radical option does not need to be
another large-scale policy pushed onto the
service. Instead there are promising signs that
parts of the NHS in England are evolving towards
these arrangements and need practical and moral
support to do so, especially in the face of a biting
financial challenge. The right leadership now
could set the NHS onto the road to this next stage
of development. 
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Commissioning appears at first glance to be
something of an obsession in the English NHS, a
function within the health system that is subject
to endless debate and frequent criticism. The
discourse suggests that if only commissioning
were to be ‘strong’, ‘world class’ or ‘effective’, much
needed changes could be brought about – such 
as moving care into community settings,
reconfiguring acute hospital services, levering
more productivity from healthcare providers, 
and bringing about better coordinated, or
integrated, care. 
But according to a wealth of research and
commentary since the role of purchasing in the
NHS was separated from the role of providing in
1991, population-based PCT commissioning of
NHS care has throughout this time struggled to 
be effective (Light, 1998; Ham, 2008; Lewis and
others, 2009). In particular, the shortcomings in
management relative to that of acute providers has
been noted (Walshe and others, 2004), and the
lack of impact in shaping the hospital sector and
reducing avoidable use of hospitals (Smith and
others, 2004; Lewis and others, 2009). 
The initial assessment of PCTs under the ‘world
class commissioning’ initiative has done little to
dispel this impression of relative weakness,
revealing as it did that a majority of PCTs were
poor or mediocre in respect of the competencies
established for world class commissioning, albeit
that some PCTs did receive ‘good’ ratings on
certain dimensions. Assessments by the Audit
Commission and the Healthcare
Commission/Care Quality Commission (Audit
Commission and Healthcare Commission, 2008)
over a longer period have shown steady
improvement by PCTs as organisations on a
number of indices, for example, financial
management, demand management and efficiency
(in part through ‘payment by results’ funding). 
Yet these improvements have fallen short of
significant influence on the services provided by
hospitals, or indeed on primary care. 
Since 1991, there have also been policies to 
allow general practitioners (GPs) to commission
through fundholding and its variants, total
fundholding and multi-funds (Smith and others,
2004). Here, there is more research and evidence
of impact, for example in curbing the rise of
emergency admissions and prescription drug
costs, and in reducing waiting times (Baines and
others, 1997; Dowling, 1997; Croxson and
others, 2001; Propper and others, 2002). 
But there were also problems. GP fundholders
had high transaction costs relative to larger
population-based entities such as health
authorities; practices were too small to take on
significant budgetary risk, they were largely
unable to tackle the entrenched interests of
hospitals (Audit Commission, 1996; Goodwin,
1998; Le Grand and others, 1998), and there
were worrying conflicts of interest as GPs were
able to re-route funds for NHS hospital care into
their primary care businesses. 
Despite this, after scrapping fundholding in 1997,
a watered-down version – practice-based
commissioning – was introduced in 2005. For a
mixture of reasons it has not incentivised GPs or
1. INTRODUCTION
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brought about significant changes to local health
services (Audit Commission, 2007; Curry and
others, 2008).
The immediate financial challenge in the public
sector, the upcoming general election, plus 
longer-standing issues such as the rising 
demand for care, are forcing a rethink of policy 
on NHS commissioning. Now more than ever
there is a need to extract more value out of the
healthcare pound by reorienting the healthcare
system towards improving wellness and
supporting people outside hospital, as well 
as improving the quality of care in hospitals 
(NHS Confederation, 2009a). 
Current thinking on supporting frail older 
people, as evidenced in the recent social care
Green Paper (Department of Health, 2009a), is
also encouraging more joint commissioning of
healthcare and social care through pooled
budgets, or local authorities allowing PCTs to
commission adult social care – all to support
wellness, independent living and avoidable 
future cost by taxpayers. The evidence on impact
so far is mixed, possibly because these
arrangements are variably implemented, outcome
measures are not always specified, monitoring is
often inadequate, and government guidance to
different sectors can appear to be conflicting
(Audit Commission, 2009a).
But it is in boosting ambulatory healthcare (care
provided on an outpatient basis) to prevent, and
substitute for, hospital care that the biggest
efficiency gains are likely to be made, and where
commissioning has most conspicuously failed to
deliver (Audit Commission, 2009b). This is the
area upon which this report focuses.
With a general election imminent, all political
parties are now re-examining policies on
commissioning, in particular practice-based
commissioning. For Labour, PCT commissioning
has not yet delivered, in a significant way, hoped
for objectives, and the impact of commissioning
using pooled funding of health and social care is
as yet tentative. Plans are afoot to offer more
support to PCTs to develop the skills needed for
effective commissioning, for example, in
procurement and contracting. 
For the Conservatives, strengthening 
practice-based commissioning through the
allocation of real budgets to GPs is a key policy,
yet how to do this while learning the lessons 
from the past and within a tight economic 
context is not made clear. The Liberal Democrats
favour ‘democratising’ commissioning by
advocating elected boards for PCTs – how 
exactly this will improve the quality and value 
for money of healthcare for patients and 
taxpayers is unclear.
Yet the enormous external challenges to be faced
by the NHS in the short to medium term and
some new opportunities (for example, from more
intelligent use of digital and information
technology) point to the need for urgent and
independent discussion of where we are now and
how we got here, and some options to strengthen
commissioning for the future. As more providers
achieve foundation status and the role of
regulators will be far more concerned with
commissioning, how might commissioning
evolve? This report discusses this question by
focusing on the past, present and possible future
of commissioning in the English NHS. 
The authors start by identifying what
commissioning is, before moving on to examine
the current arrangements for commissioning 
in place within the NHS. This is followed by 
an analysis of the problems with current
commissioning arrangements, and the offering 
of an overall verdict on its performance to 
date. The report ends by suggesting what might
be done to boost NHS commissioning in a
significant way.
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‘Commissioning’ in the NHS is where an
organisation, and/or a group of clinicians, acts on
behalf of a population to decide which health
services to buy – using tax funds allocated by the
Department of Health – according to a formula
based on health needs. 
In the international context, this role in funding
and determining services is more usually known
as ‘purchasing’ – a term used in England between
1990 and 1996 in the early days of the NHS
internal market. In order to distinguish the
difference between purchasing and
commissioning, as commonly understood in the
NHS, Woodin’s (2006: p203) definition is helpful:
Commissioning is a term used most in the UK
context and tends to denote a proactive strategic
role in planning, designing and implementing the
range of services required, rather than a more
passive purchasing role. A commissioner decides
which services or healthcare interventions should 
be provided, who should provide them and how
they should be paid for, and may work closely with
the provider in implementing changes. A purchaser
buys what is on offer or reimburses the provider on
the basis of usage.
This interpretation of commissioning draws on
the work of Ovretveit (1995) who distinguished
commissioning from purchasing by describing a
broad set of linked activities including needs
assessment, priority setting, procurement through
contracts, monitoring of service delivery and
review/evaluation.
In this report, commissioning is interpreted 
in much the same way, seeing it as an activity 
carried out by an organisation (or collective 
of professionals) on behalf of a geographic 
or enrolled population, and entailing 
decision-making about needs assessment,
resource allocation, service purchasing,
monitoring and review. 
2. WHAT IS MEANT BY ‘COMMISSIONING’?
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Primary care trusts
Commissioning of NHS-funded healthcare 
in England currently takes place through two
main routes. 
The first is via primary care trusts (PCTs), the 152
statutory bodies with responsibility for improving
the health of the local population by using public
money to commission a range of health services.
PCTs are responsible for the majority of NHS
resources and for making decisions about
spending priorities, taking account of local needs
and national policy direction. They evolved from
a merger of the primary care groups (PCGs) that
were put in place by the Labour Government in
1999 (collectives of GPs, nurses, managers, social
workers and lay people) and health authorities
that were the main local NHS purchasing bodies
until 2002. 
The political move in 1997 to develop PCGs across
England, replacing the ‘mosaic’ of fundholding and
commissioning groups previously in place (Smith
and others, 1997), meant that all GPs and their
primary care teams became members of primary
care commissioning organisations (in other words
PCGs). Membership by practices of PCGs was
compulsory, in comparison with the voluntary
nature of GP fundholding and its variants such 
as total purchasing. PCGs evolved into PCTs,
which crucially are not primary care organisations
as understood in the 1990s in the UK (and in 
other countries currently) since they are statutory
NHS bodies that assume a whole variety of
functions previously performed by health
authorities (public health, partnership working
with local government, purchasing of secondary
and tertiary care, for example) and not ‘owned’ by
local clinicians (Smith and Walshe, 2004; Smith
and Mays, 2007). 
The PCT model assumes that PCTs can become
strong local commissioners, drawing together: 
 public health expertise in needs assessment
 integrated funding for hospital, community and
primary care services
 management responsibility for most community
health (and sometimes mental health and some
acute) services. 
The PCT was created to assume financial risk for 
a defined geographic population, providing the
community health services it had inherited, and
buying in the rest within annual resource limits
based on a nationally set capitation formula. The
potential for PCTs as commissioners was
underlined in Shifting the Balance of Power: The
next steps (Department of Health, 2002: p8):
[PCTs will be taking] the lead in developing and
redesigning systems in primary and secondary 
care as well as tackling public health issues locally
[...] In addition [...], they will have 75 per cent 
of the total NHS budget allocated to them for
decision making.
The PCT also has responsibility for the
commissioning of primary care services, holding
and managing the contracts for general practice,
general dental services, local pharmaceutical
services and optometry.
3. WHAT ARE THE CURRENT ARRANGEMENTS FOR 
COMMISSIONING IN THE NHS?
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Practice-based commissioning
The second route for NHS commissioning is
through practice-based commissioning. 
Practice-based commissioning is a form of
primary care-led purchasing where PCTs allocate
to practices a notional (not real) budget which
can be used to commission community- and
hospital-based services to meet the needs of the
practices’ registered population. Practice-based
commissioners are – subject to the approval of 
the PCT – able to keep financial savings in 
order to develop other local services (that is, a
not-for-profit arrangement), and they can pay
themselves to provide such services (on a 
for-profit basis, although such services may be
subject to a national tariff or price) or purchase
them from other providers. Thus practice-based
commissioning is not purely concerned with
commissioning, it is also (some would say more
so) associated with the extension of provision of
primary care services by local practices. This 
was also a common feature of GP fundholding
and total purchasing (Mays and others, 2001),
where GPs took full advantage of these
opportunities, for example, through forming
limited companies through which to trade their
provider services.
Practice-based commissioning takes a range of
forms, depending on the local context and history,
particularly in how practices work together and
the relationship that they have with the PCT
(Curry and others, 2008). These forms include: 
 individual practices
 consortia of practices in a locality
 groups including all practices in a PCT
 organisations based on personal medical
services (PMS) provider groups
 social enterprise organisations established to
manage and coordinate practice-based
commissioning. 
In recent research undertaken by The King’s Fund
and the NHS Alliance (Wood and Curry, 2009),
30 per cent of respondents in a survey of 
practice-based commissioners reported that their
practice-based commissioning cluster had set
itself up as a formal organisation. Organisational
forms being used in such cases include: company
limited by guarantee; community interest
company; social enterprise; and public limited
company. One example of the latter was where
almost all the practices in one PCT had joined 
the practice-based commissioning group that 
was run by two appointed medical directors.
These part-time GPs received a separate salary
and had protected time and resources to run 
the company. 
PCTs group together for the purpose of
commissioning specialised services, in order 
to spread financial risk for the costs of 
high-cost patients over a larger population and 
to optimise transaction costs. These specialised
commissioning groups may operate at supra-PCT
level, strategic health authority (SHA) level or at
national level for services for people with very
rare conditions.
What this all adds up to is a complex set of
commissioning arrangements that can be
considered as either a matrix or, as in work
carried out in 2004 (Smith and others, 2004), 
a continuum of commissioning arrangements,
running from the level of the individual (in 
other words, the holding of a personal 
budget with which to purchase care for one’s
health needs) through to that of a nation 
(see Figure 1 on p.37 for an updated version of
the 2004 commissioning continuum). A fuller
assessment of the current complexity of
commissioning (and commissioning/providing)
arrangements is made in Table 1, opposite,
drawing on similar analysis carried out by Mays
and Dixon (1996) of the 1990s internal market
purchasing arrangements.
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Table 1: Profiles of current commissioning models in the NHS, 2009 
(adapted from Mays and Dixon, 1996)
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50,000,0001 5,000,000–
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7,000,000
As for PCT
where
boundaries
are 
coterminous
Average
320,0002
Average
320,000
Average
100,0003
Average
5,500
Average
5,5004
1 Population
size
Country-
wide
Geographi-
cal: four 
regional
groups
(north, 
Midlands,
south-east
and south-
west)
Geographical
(ten groups
coterminous
with SHAs)
Geographical 
boundaries
Geographical 
boundaries
All practices
in a PCT
area
Usually 
geographic,
though
sometimes
practice-
based
Practice-
based
Practice-
based
IndividualGeography or
practice-
based
Real budgets
contributed
by PCTs
Real budgets
contributed
by PCTs
Real pooled
budgets and
financial
risk-sharing
schemes 
Several 
models of
joint funding:
pooling of
funds, grants
and 
delegation 
of functions.
Also non-
statutory 
options, eg,
budget 
alignment5
Own 
capitation-
based budget
for acute, 
community
and primary
care services
Indicative
budget for a
specific
range of
services
Indicative
budget for a
specific
range of
services
Own budget
for core and
extended
primary care
services, 
plus 
indicative
PBC budget
Indicative
budget for 
a specific
range of
services
Indicative
budget. 
Possibly real
budget from
Sept 2010
Degree of
budgetary 
control for
purchasing
Very rare
treatments
such as
heart 
transplants
Rare 
treatments
including 
severe burns
Relatively rare 
treatments
such as 
children and
young 
people’s 
cancers and
haemophilia.
Also CAMHS6
Any health-
related local
authority
service 
All hospital
and 
community
health 
services 
and primary
care
Varies, 
usually some 
community
and second-
ary care 
services for 
long-term
conditions 
(LTCs)
Varies, 
usually 
some 
community
and 
secondary
care services
for LTCs
Varies, 
usually 
some or
most 
community
services, and
other LTC
services
Varies, 
usually 
some 
community
and 
secondary
care services
for LTCs
Not yet 
up and 
running.
Will be very
limited to
LTC services
Range of 
services 
commissioned
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Table 1: Profiles of current commissioning models in the NHS, 2009 continued
(adapted from Mays and Dixon, 1996)
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None None None Can provide
any health-
related local
authority
service. Can
also delegate
functions
All 
community
health 
services and
sometimes
services for
mental health
and people
with learning 
difficulties 
Core and 
extended
primary 
care within
and across 
practices
Core and 
extended
primary 
care within
and across
practices
Core and 
extended
primary
care, 
including
LTC services
into 
secondary
care
Core 
primary care
and perhaps
some extra
services
within 
practice
NoneProvider role
London SHA
hosts the
NSCG7 on
behalf of all
SHAs with
represent-
ation from
each 
regional
SCG. NCSG
has respon-
sibility for
oversight of
specialised
commission-
ing.9
Groups of
SCGs8 work
together in
partnership.
Each SCG is
represented 
Organised at
SHA level.
Dedicated
multi-
disciplinary
team of 
officers carry
out activity
on behalf of
PCTs
Some joint
appointments
of PCT and
local 
authority but
more often
two separate 
organisations
with 
bureaucratic
hierarchy
working in
partnership
Bureaucratic
hierarchy
with public
health, GP
and other
professional
advice on
commission-
ing
May have its
own CEO
and 
management
support
funded by
PCT, or may
come from
PCT
Typically a
manager
within the
PCT and 
access to
other PCT
support
functions
Own 
management
support
funded
through
PMS and
practices
Reliant on
PCT 
management
support for
PBC
Individual
manages
budget and
services with
help from
GP
Management 
structure
Extensive
autonomy
from PCT
Extensive
autonomy
Each PCT is
represented
but group 
is fairly 
autonomous 
N/A N/A Varies 
depending
on local
arrange-
ments, but
typically
modest
Modest or
weak
Extensive
autonomy
apart from
via PMS
contract 
and PBC
agreement
Weak, as
lack scale 
for extensive
commission-
ing
Weak. 
decision-
making
powers 
currently
limited but
with 
potential to
increase
Degree of
autonomy
from PCT/
influence
over PCT
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1. www.specialisedcommissioning.nhs.uk/ for population
estimates.
2. www.specialisedcommissioning.nhs.uk/3_who_does_ss_
commissioning.htm PCT population range from around 
200,000 (for example, Camden) to 600,000 (South Staffordshire,
for example).
3. Based on the mean from survey data (Wood and Curry, 2009). 
4. www.york.ac.uk/inst/che/pdf/rp3.pdf: average practice size in
England is 5,500.
5. www.audit-commission.gov.uk/SiteCollectionDocuments/Audit
CommissionReports/NationalStudies/ClarifyingJointFinancing
4Dec08REP.pdf
6. Child and adolescent mental health services.
7. National specialised commissioning group.
8. Specialised commissioning group.
9. Decision-making for national commissioning ultimately lies 
with Ministers.
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Table 1 characterises the current forms of
commissioning in the NHS and how they differ
along key variables – from specialised
commissioning entities made up of multiple PCTs
to various forms of practice-based commissioning
– and includes some of the primary care provider
organisations that also play a commissioning role,
such as PMS groupings. 
At least six main observations can be made from
Table 1, assessing the current situation in relation
to how this compares with models of
commissioning that have been used in the NHS
since 1991. 
First, there is the interlocking continuum of
commissioning arrangements that was mentioned
earlier and is explored in more depth later in the
report. As argued elsewhere (Smith and others,
2004), different services are amenable to different
forms of commissioning. For example, primary
care-led approaches are likely to be more effective
for community-based chronic disease
management and primary care services, given 
that patients with chronic disease receive 
much of their care in out-of-hospital settings, 
and GPs and other primary care professionals 
are well placed to specify how such care could be
further improved.
Second, a minority of models are more ‘purely’
concerned with commissioning (such as
specialised commissioning arrangements), while
other models combine commissioning and
provider functions. This dilemma of whether
commissioners should be at once purchasers 
and providers has been present in NHS policy 
for almost 20 years. For example, Mays and
Dixon (1996) noted the paradox of policy: 
on the one hand aiming for contestability 
between providers; and on the other eroding 
the supposed split between purchasing and
providing through giving GPs increasing influence
over purchasing of hospital and community
health services.
Third, there is a relative lack of budgetary control
and overall autonomy experienced by the
practice-based commissioning models, except
where they are based on a PMS-type provider
organisation or consist of a large consortium with
its own chief executive and management support.
This is mirrored in the rather constrained range of
services that many of the practice-based
commissioning models appear to purchase. PCTs
still retain much of the commissioning
responsibility and all the financial risk. Existing
primary care provider consortia (such as PMS
arrangements) offer the most potential for
autonomous commissioning of local services by
GPs and their teams. 
Fourth, is the persisting ‘twin-track’ of
commissioning approaches for the majority of
services in the NHS, with the ‘meso’ PCT- and
population-based ones in many ways taking up
where health authorities left off, and ‘micro’
practice-based commissioning and its variants
following in the footsteps of fundholding and its
alternatives (albeit more diluted). To this could be
added an emerging third track of commissioning
approaches: person-level commissioning via
personal budgets. Furthermore, since 1991 (and
for some services even earlier) there have been
national and regional arrangements for
commissioning specialised services, usually those
that are high cost and low volume. Regional
specialised services agencies existed prior to the
implementation of the NHS market in 1991 and
represent a relatively consistent (or persistent)
part of the continuum of commissioning models.
The essential duality of population-based and
patient-focused commissioning in the NHS has
long been noted, as has the possibility that the
sum of multiple micro purchasing decisions might
not always add up to a pattern of service
provision appropriate to the needs of the
population concerned (Ham, 1996; Mays and
Dixon, 1996). This is very relevant now that free
choice of provider has also been introduced for
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patients, further complicating the commissioning
task. It raises a critical question about who
designs, monitors and takes overall responsibility
for the matrix of commissioning approaches in a
local area, a topic that is looked at again later in
this report. 
Fifth, is the relative lack of diversity within the
practice-based approaches to commissioning in
2010 compared to the 1990s, in particular the
relative lack of autonomy of the practice-based
approaches (from the PCT) and the fact that they
do not hold real budgets. Since 1991 there have
been few significant ‘hybrid’ approaches that have
drawn hospital clinicians together with primary
care doctors into commissioning organisations:
the majority of practice-based commissioning
takes place in locality consortia (Curry and
others, 2008) with small numbers of ‘innovators’
developing approaches that extend beyond
primary care into secondary or social care.
Finally, the approaches are all in effect
accountable vertically to higher authorities within
the NHS and Department of Health, with no
examples of other accountability such as direct
patient choice of commissioner (apart from the
theoretical choice of practice-based commissioner
by selecting a GP practice), or accountability to
local people through more democratic/elected or
patient involvement routes.
In summary, the most striking message from this
analysis is the complexity of commissioning
arrangements, the different levels at which
commissioning takes place, and the overlap in
many ‘commissioning’ organisations between
provider and commissioner functions. This report
focuses on commissioning currently undertaken
at the level of PCTs and practice-based consortia,
in order to understand the problems
commissioners face and to provide some
suggestions as to how these might be addressed.
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Problems related directly to 
PCTs and practice-based
commissioning policy
1. Weak control over volume of referrals
Expenditure by PCTs is largely driven by clinical
choices made by GPs and hospital doctors, which
the PCT cannot easily influence. Furthermore,
patients now have free choice of provider, which
means in theory, at least, that even if PCTs were
able to influence clinical decisions in local general
practices and hospitals, patients may choose care
in other hospitals. This weakens considerably the
control the PCTs have over their budgets, for
although the tariff fixes the price of an episode of
care, they struggle to exert an influence over how
much activity is referred. 
Some PCTs have set up management centres
through which all GP referrals to secondary care
must pass, offering PCTs a degree of control over
GPs’ referrals together with better information
about them. The aim of these centres is to reduce
inappropriate referrals and introduce a level of
quality control, the assumption being that there are
inherent inefficiencies within the system that can
be removed (Davies and Elwyn, 2006). Evidence as
to the impact of these centres is yet to emerge: their
introduction has not been without controversy,
with concerns being raised that they could lead to a
loss of communication between generalists and
specialists and have an impact on continuity of care
(Davies and Elwyn, 2006), reduce patient choice,
and lead to potentially dangerous, and costly,
delays in treatment (Lapsley, 2007). 
There has been a lot of effort by PCTs to try to
reduce avoidable emergency admissions, for
example, through identifying high-risk patients
using risk stratification tools such as patients at risk
of re-hospitalisation (Billings and others, 2006) and
case management by community matrons, or a host
of other interventions such as telehealth, telecare
and virtual wards (Lewis, 2006). Again, the impact
of these is only just emerging.
It is important to note that GPs only control 
a proportion of hospital activity (elective 
referrals and some emergency care) and 
PCTs have to pay for episodes of care that result
from consultant-to-consultant referrals, and 
from other emergency activity. As is discussed
further in this report, the incentives embedded 
in practice-based commissioning are not
sufficiently strong for GPs to counteract the
financial incentives for hospitals to increase
activity.
2. Commissioner and provider functions mixed
PCTs also deliver community health services,
although this is intended to cease in the 
near future, as the policy of Transforming 
Community Services (Department of Health,
2009d) is implemented, and community 
services are transferred into new organisational
forms separate from PCT commissioners.
Observers disagree as to whether having a
provider function is necessarily a handicap 
or distraction for a commissioning 
organisation, and it is yet to be seen whether 
all PCTs actually stop providing services 
directly. 
4. WHAT ARE THE PROBLEMS WITH CURRENT 
COMMISSIONING ARRANGEMENTS?
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Indeed, one of the possible futures for
commissioning set out in recent work by the
Nuffield Trust and NHS Alliance (Smith and
others, 2009) involves GP groups taking ‘make or
buy’ decisions relating to health services for their
enrolled populations and is deliberately based on
GPs as providers. However, the key issue is
whether an integrated commissioner–provider 
has responsibility for the delivery of the most
appropriate services and can influence which
services are provided directly and which are
purchased from others. 
3. Organisational turbulence in PCTs relative to
provider organisations
PCTs and their forerunners have experienced
numerous imposed reorganisations that have
prevented them from making and demonstrating
consistent progress over time (Smith and others,
2001; Dickinson and others, 2006). NHS acute
trusts and foundation trusts have, overall, been
less subject to periodic reorganisation over the
past two decades. Indeed, the current
Transforming Community Services policy
represents the latest in a line of reorganisations
faced by PCTs, as work is carried out to find new
organisational and governance form for
community health services.
4. Autonomy limited
PCTs are constrained in how they operate, being
subject to direct performance management by
SHAs and the Department of Health, having to
keep within a specified budget annually,
possessing no potential to retain savings and
invest resources for future use, and having lower
access to capital for investment. These features
make PCTs more risk-averse organisations in
comparison with provider trusts and foundation
trusts, and restrict their capacity to implement
bold and possibly unpopular commissioning
strategies. Indeed, even where a PCT would like
to make changes to its commissioning strategies,
or decommission services, the need to break even
on an annual basis and to give six months’ notice
to any change to a contract, limits its ability to
make swift changes (NHS Confederation, 2009b).
5. Relatively weak clinical leadership and engagement
Clinical leadership and engagement in PCTs is
typically weaker than in their provider
counterparts. NHS trusts have a long history of
clinical engagement in budget-holding, service
planning and general management, dating back 
at least to the resource management initiative 
of the 1980s. The core feature of resource
management and clinical budget-holding persists
within many trusts which operate with a ‘clinical
directorate’ model with (usually) a doctor in the
clinical director role for a specific service,
supported by a general manager and a senior
nurse or other professional. Clinical directors
often form part of the main management team 
of a hospital or other provider, ensuring 
clinician involvement in strategic leadership of 
the organisation. 
In PCTs, or practice-based commissioning groups,
there is no direct equivalent of a clinical
directorate system for the commissioning activity
of organisations. Clinical engagement and
leadership rest significantly upon GPs’
involvement in professional executive committees,
which may be more advisory in nature rather 
than playing a central role in driving change
(NHS Alliance, 2006). 
Furthermore, GPs are contractors to PCTs (and
hence volunteers in respect of providing clinical
advice to PCT commissioning), and not core
employees in the way that consultants are within
NHS and foundation trusts. Practice-based
commissioning has gone some way to increasing
clinical involvement in PCT business but such
engagement remains purely voluntary and, as
such, relies upon the personal enthusiasm of GPs,
resulting in very variable levels of engagement
across the country. Thus PCTs face a significant
challenge in respect of clinical legitimacy. 
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6. Public legitimacy of commissioners
A fundamental issue that has some bearing on the
capacity of PCTs as commissioners – at least in
terms of their role in seeking to interpret and
enact local health priorities and needs – relates to
the perceived or actual public legitimacy of the
organisations (Thorlby and others, 2008).
Accountability to the local population is arguably
weak (Glasby and others, forthcoming), other than
for decisions about significant change in services
for which there is a statutory duty to consult. In a
Local Government Association report (Local
Government Association, 2008, p31), ‘more than
half the respondents did not know what a PCT
was or did. Almost three-quarters of those
questioned could not name their local PCT, and
fewer than one in ten had been involved in a
patient group or any other forum concerned with
local NHS services.’ 
The local population has no choice of PCT, and
unpopular PCT boards cannot be voted out by
local democratic processes. Instead, the lines of
accountability run upwards to the SHA and,
ultimately, to the chief executive of the NHS. On
the other hand, NHS foundation trusts were
established as public benefit corporations and
have a membership drawn from the local
community, although the number and
involvement of members is variable. 
Arrangements for public involvement include local
involvement networks, which are independent
networks of individuals and community groups
who work to improve local health and social
services. How far they are able to have a significant
influence on the scope, quality and direction of
local services is as yet unclear. 
PCT commissioners are also held to account by
the health overview and scrutiny committee
(OSC) of the relevant local authority, a body
comprised of elected local councillors that has a
responsibility for scrutinising how local health
services are provided and developed. OSCs can
invite senior staff to provide information and
explanations about how local health needs are
being addressed, with the intention of enabling
open local debate about specific services, or care
for people with a certain condition.
A further area where PCT legitimacy is sometimes
subject to challenge – and is likely to be to a
greater extent as the financial downturn impacts
on health funding – is in how priorities for health
funding are set, both in respect of investment and
disinvestment. Recent commentary (Crump,
2008) suggests that PCTs have yet to focus much
time and attention on decommissioning services,
and new research (Robinson and others,
forthcoming) will report on how far PCTs have
arrangements in place for making such decisions,
and what they do in order to account to or
involve the public in such decision-making.
7. Capability and capacity for commissioning
‘World Class Commissioning’ (Department of
Health, 2007a) represents an attempt to articulate
the skills a commissioner might require and 
how these should be developed. There is,
however, a lack of specific training for
commissioning – the first courses have only
recently started at the University of Teeside2 and
the University of Birmingham. This is in stark
contrast to the well-established NHS management
scheme that has specific streams for general,
human resource, finance, information and
communications’ management, but no dedicated
cohort for commissioning. 
Unsurprisingly, research studies have pointed to a
critical skills gap among commissioners, both at
1. www.lga.gov.uk/lga/aio/721828 2. www.healthcarerepublic.com/education/index.cfm?
fuseaction=HCR.Education.Courses.Article&nEventID=3238 
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PCT and practice-based commissioning levels. 
A recent survey found that 80 per cent of
practice-based commissioners felt they lacked
some or all the necessary skills (Wood and Curry,
2009). The ‘necessary skills’ that they identified
included, among others: negotiation, financial
aptitude, data analysis and management. Similarly,
PCTs themselves acknowledge that they struggle to
fill commissioning posts with experienced
individuals (Curry and others, 2008). Given that
commissioning is a relatively new role within the
NHS, perhaps this is not surprising. A further issue
is that skills for commissioning take a long time to
develop, as does an in-depth understanding of a
local health community and its needs. As noted
earlier, commissioning organisations in the NHS
have been reorganised approximately every two to
three years since the early 1990s, meaning that
key commissioners – and their skills – are lost to
organisations and the system has to redevelop
such capacity and capability. 
World class commissioning represents a statement
of intent towards which commissioning bodies
should be working: the intention of the statement
being to drive ‘unprecedented improvement in
patient outcomes’ and ensure that ‘the NHS
remains one of the most progressive and 
high-performing health systems in the world’
(Department of Health, 2007a: p1). In so doing,
the Department of Health hopes that world class
commissioning will shift the focus away from
more passive contracting towards proactive
commissioning focused on prevention and
wellbeing. Underpinning the vision is a set of 11
competencies, each of which is supported by a
series of skills. The skills range from the very
specific (for example, database management)
through the very general (for example, relationship
building), to the highly skilled (accountancy and
priority setting, for example), highlighting the
variety of skills that commissioning requires
(Department of Health, 2007b).
In order to judge PCTs’ progress against
competencies, an assurance framework has been
developed by the Department of Health. The first
round of assurance reports was completed in
February 2009. The Department of Health set
expectations deliberately low, suggesting that
most PCTs would only score around 1 or 2 in the
four-point scoring system. Actual scores exceeded
these expectations with level 3 being awarded 37
times. At first glance, these results might suggest
that commissioning is in a better state than first
anticipated. The Department of Health, on
launching the second assurance process, noted:
The results from last year’s assurance process
shows PCTs are making real improvements in the
way they commission services but there remains
much to be done in the coming year.
(Department of Health website,1 16 September 2009) 
The NHS Confederation concurred, claiming that: 
... there is no doubt that [world class
commissioning] has had an impact. The profile of
PCTs as local leaders of the NHS has risen, and the
growing confidence and focus of commissioners is
reflected in their ambitious strategic plans. 
(NHS Confederation, 2009b)
The Audit Commission has also identified some
encouraging indicators of progress. The latest
Annual Local Evaluation report of PCTs pointed
to an ‘overall picture ... of significant
improvement over the three years assessed’ (Audit
Commission, 2008). One example highlighted
was of Ashton, Leigh and Wigan, a PCT that had
sought to achieve successful commissioning by
establishing a single commissioning agency in
1. www.dh.gov.uk/en/Publicationsandstatistics/
Publications/PublicationsPolicyAndGuidance/DH_105117 
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partnership with the local council. A further
example of good progress highlighted by the
Audit Commission was that of the five-year
commissioning plan developed by Heywood,
Middleton and Rochdale PCT, underpinned by 
a financial modelling tool that was intended to
inform strategy and planning (Audit Commission
website, good practice examples1).
However, the usefulness of the world class
commissioning assurance-scoring framework has
been called into question. The four-point scoring
system has been criticised as too limited (Lynas,
King’s Fund website2), allowing PCTs at very
different stages in their development to achieve
very similar scores. The handbook for the 
second assurance process states that the revised
assessment framework is more targeted with 
a focus on quality and productivity, but the 
four-level scoring system has been retained
(Department of Health, 2009e). Concern has 
also been expressed that the type of criteria used 
might not be easy to score precisely (Woodin 
and Wade, 2007). 
The CQC’s Annual Health Check (2008/09)
indicated that 70 per cent of PCTs fully met the
core standards as commissioners of services. 
A further 28 per cent ‘almost met’ the standards, 
1 per cent ‘partly met’ them and no PCTs were
classed as not having met the standards. No
comparison with earlier years was possible as this
was the first year PCTs had been required to make
separate declarations as commissioners and
providers. Previously, PCTs had made one overall
core standards declaration – in 2007/08, 5 per
cent scored ‘not met’ and in 2006/07, it was 
11 per cent. In addition, in 2008/09, 51 per cent
of PCTs were full year compliant for all core
standards as commissioners. In the joint
declaration in 2007/08, only 21 per cent were full
year compliant (Care Quality Commission, NHS
performance ratings 2008/093). This suggests that
progress is being made in respect of
commissioning performance. It will be interesting
to see what the second round of world class
commissioning assessment reveals in this respect.
Although capability is clearly a critical factor in
delivering the world class commissioning 
agenda, the weakness in commissioning also
stems from limitations in capacity. The Audit
Commission and Healthcare Commission pointed
to ‘under-developed commissioning capacity’ as a
key limitation in the reform programme (Audit
Commission and Healthcare Commission, 2008).
Commissioners have expressed concern about the
burden of collecting and compiling information
and evidence for the assurance process
(Department of Health, 2008a) and, although the
Department of Health has promised to align the
three assessments required by world class
commissioning, the Care Quality Commission
(CQC) health check and the Audit Commission’s
assessments, some critics still question whether
the effort entailed in data collection will be
outweighed by the benefits of improved
commissioning (Ham, 2008).  
Practice-based commissioners frequently cite a
lack of time as the prime reason for their limited
involvement in commissioning activities,
something that has been highlighted in numerous
studies of primary care-led commissioning (Mays
and others, 2001; Regen and others, 2001;
Dowling and Glendinning, 2003; Smith and
Goodwin, 2006). Most see practice-based
commissioning as something they dabble in after
1. www.audit-commission.gov.uk/health/goodpractice/pages/
default.aspx 
2. www.kingsfund.org.uk/what_we_do/articles/world_class.html 
3. www.cqc.org.uk/_db/_documents/0809_NHS_
ratings_overview_document_161009_200910164847.pdf 
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hours when they have some spare time – few 
GPs have managed to ring-fence significant time
to engage in practice-based commissioning and
few appear to feel that there is much incentive to
do so (Curry and others, 2008; Coleman and
others, 2009). 
Attempts have been made centrally to strengthen
commissioning through establishing the
Framework for External Support for
Commissioning (FESC) in 2007 and, in late 2008,
the Practice-based Commissioning Development
Framework. Both frameworks are intended to
provide PCTs and practice-based commissioners
with support to achieve the aspirations of world 
class commissioning. Both frameworks allow 
for a range of support to be purchased – from
joint work between the PCT/practice-based
commissioners and the private provider to
complete outsourcing of elements of
commissioning. Little is known about the 
uptake of the practice-based commissioning
development framework yet (having only 
been introduced in December 2008) 
but research into uptake of FESC suggests 
that only ten contracts, albeit of large 
monetary values, have been signed (Naylor 
and Goodwin, forthcoming). 
8. Data and information
As mentioned above, data analysis has been
identified as one of the key skills required by
practices and PCTs to undertake effective
commissioning but one that many of them feel
they lack. As more data are available and able to
be linked at person-level, commissioners want to
analyse demand (public health and epidemiology
data, together with information about service
utilisation) in far more detail. The lack of
analytical skills to manipulate and investigate 
data has led some SHAs to develop data
‘warehouses’ or commissioning business support
units that concentrate staff with specialist skills,
for example, as in the West Midlands Strategic
Health Authority’s Commissioning Business
Support Agency.
PCTs often receive hospital activity data some
time after the event and have limited time and
specialist expertise to challenge any coding. As
mentioned earlier in this report, referral
management centres set up by PCTs can provide
detailed information about referrals, this being of
value to a PCT looking to redesign services and
reduce avoidable secondary care activity. This
could also be of use to PCTs in monitoring quality
and safety.
9. The relationship between practice-based
commissioning and PCTs
The introduction of practice-based commissioning
has meant that commissioning roles have been
dispersed across PCTs and practice-based
commissioning clusters. As noted above, the
organisational structure of practice-based
commissioning is undeveloped relative to that of
the PCT, and relative to hospitals. This means that
hospitals either negotiate with a PCT – whose
capacity to influence clinical referral decisions 
is limited – or disparate practice-based
commissioning groupings, who are largely
relatively ineffective and uncoordinated. There
has consequently been a lack of engagement with
hospital-based clinicians to allow meaningful
transfer of clinical risk to ambulatory care.
Furthermore, contracts with trusts are inflexible,
long-term and difficult to change. For these
reasons, practice-based commissioning groups, as
well as total purchasing pilots and fundholding
practices before them, have been largely unable to
reshape hospital services in a significant manner
(Smith and others 2004; Curry and others, 2008). 
Another reason might be the lack of incentives 
in practice-based commissioning for GPs to get
involved in strategic decision-making at a PCT
level. In practice-based commissioning, the
budgets are ‘notional’ not ‘hard’, the financial risk
for commissioning decisions still sits at the PCT,
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and there are relatively few sanctions available to
a PCT if a practice-based commissioner is over-
spending. A PCT may strip a practice-based
commissioner of its budget but, given that the
budget is ‘notional’ anyway and arguably does not
afford the GP(s) much freedom, it presents little
threat to GPs unwilling to engage. Another
sanction theoretically available is for the PCT to
remove a GP’s contract, which is an extremely
blunt tool and arguably disproportionate in 
the circumstances. 
10. The constraints of financial cycles
It is not at present possible for practice-based
commissioners to transfer commissioning funds
(i.e. savings) into the general medical services
(GMS) budget for primary care (i.e. the general
practice ‘business’), although GPs may make
person financial gains if they set up a limited
provider company and trade through that vehicle.
Conflicts of interest are inherent in these
arrangements, as seen in fundholding and its
variants (Goodwin, 1998). While PCTs are
responsible for policing practice-based
commissioning, many are struggling to put
workable governance processes in place to deal
effectively with such conflicts (Curry and others,
2008). PCTs also face constraints related to
financial cycles, and these are explored later in
this report, in relation to differentials in PCT and
provider trust power and status.
11. Notional not ‘hard’ budgets
One reason why practice-based commissioners
have ‘notional’ rather than ‘hard’ budgets is
because the method of setting a budget for such
groups is at present crude; the allocation
methodology being an insufficiently accurate
predictor of future costs. If practice-based
commissioning groups were to receive hard
budgets using the current method of resource
allocation, many would make windfall savings
through chance occurrence, and similarly others
would make windfall losses through no fault of
their own. The Department of Health funded
further analysis to improve the accuracy of
practice-based commissioning budgets and to
develop a person-based risk adjusted resource
allocation model. This model is being used in the
NHS for budget allocations from 1 April 2010
(Dixon and others, forthcoming).
Other reasons for the allocation of notional, rather
than real, budgets to practice-based
commissioners include: caution on the part of
policy-makers about allocating significant sums of
public money to new and unproven GP
organisations; a desire for practice-based
commissioners to prove capability as
commissioners before assuming real budgets; an
intention to shift budget allocations towards ‘fair
shares’ before making them ‘real’; and protecting
practice-based commissioners from full financial
risk. There is also work to be done to determine
the level at which different financial risks would
need to be pooled, how practices/consortia would
be held to account for both financial and health
outcomes, and to determine whether clinicians
would be able to gain personally from any
surpluses or put their personal businesses at risk
in the case of deficits.
Problems related to the wider
features of the English NHS
1. Weak incentives for commissioners to improve
quality and reduce costs of provision
Commissioners have had incentives to improve
arising from scrutiny and challenge by SHAs, by
overview and scrutiny committees set up by the
local authority, and by regulators such as the Care
Quality Commission (for quality) and the Audit
Commission (for financial management and use
of resources). However, the metrics for use by
regulators when assessing the performance of
commissioners are still relatively undeveloped,
and the prompt by regulation is less powerful
than a financial squeeze or central directive. 
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As noted above, there is little challenge coming
from local populations because local
accountability is relatively weak.
This may change, as from 2011 the NHS receives
practically no real terms increase in funding for
frontline care and cuts in other budgets, for
example, a suggested 30 per cent cut in
management costs by PCTs and SHAs
(Department of Health, 2009b).
2. The power differential between PCTs and trusts
PCTs, the main NHS commissioning bodies,
appear to be fundamentally weaker organisations
when compared with the powerful position
occupied by health providers, and, in particular,
hospitals. This is probably for a number of
reasons. For some managers, working life in
hospitals may be perceived as more exciting and
challenging than in a PCT, being closer to highly
specialised patient care and able to see more
direct consequences of management effort. There
is also some evidence that average salaries are
higher in trusts than in PCTs (Belfield, 2010).
The status of hospitals relative to PCTs is
different. PCTs have been described as network
organisations (Peck and Freeman, 2005) that
draw together a range of providers, funders and
planners in a wider network of NHS and local
government partnerships. This contrasts with the
institutional nature of hospital trusts whose
buildings, services, staff – and even name –
typically embody a central position and role
within the life and history of a particular
community. A PCT is neither likely to be known,
nor its function understood, by most members of
the public, but a hospital will be well known and
regarded as a critical part (and fundamental to the
place-shaping) of the locality or town (Wade and
others, 2006). 
Analysis of NHS management has pointed to a
‘twin track’ career path, whereby there are parallel
cohorts of senior managers: the one concentrated
within provider services and focused on gaining
posts in ever larger acute hospitals; the other
located within purchasing, funding and primary
care organisations, including health authorities
and primary care trusts (Smith, 2009). 
Another contemporary feature reinforcing the
difference in status between the two sets of
managers relates to the foundation trust
programme, which, hitherto, has focused largely
on acute hospitals. As a result, the managers of
these hospitals can argue that they are highly
autonomous and fully responsible for their own
‘businesses’, and demand greater rewards and as 
a result have arguably higher status. By contrast,
PCT executives are seen by some as responsible
for implementing government priorities, a 
quasi-bureaucratic and, therefore, lower-status
activity in the management world.
The structure of NHS finances has created a
further imbalance of power between PCTs and
foundation trusts. PCTs are required under the
Resource Accounting and Budgeting rules to
break even each and every year (Department 
of Health, 2001). This means that any revenue
surplus made must be used up in the year
immediately following and so necessarily 
prevents a PCT from building up significant
savings to make large-scale service change. In
contrast, foundation trusts have much greater
financial freedoms as they are not required to
break even in the year and are able to operate
more like a business (building up surpluses 
and borrowing funds). This affords foundation
trusts greater opportunities to make significant
longer-term investments.
3. Payment by results
The current NHS payment regime is another
factor impinging on the ability of PCTs and
practice-based commissioners to strengthen 
their commissioning function. The way that 
the payment by results system of reimbursing
providers for activity is established means that 
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the tariff for each healthcare-related group may
include a number of associated procedures such
as diagnostic tests. Although practice-based
commissioners may be interested in undertaking
some of those procedures themselves, thus cutting
costs and providing a more convenient service,
pricing this fairly is difficult. There is little
incentive for providers to assist PCTs in
‘unbundling’ these tariffs, hence PCTs struggle to
calculate an accurate amount. Efforts are now
being made to unbundle the tariff at a national
level (Department of Health, 2009c) but
ambiguity remains for many component services
that could be undertaken outside hospital. 
A further challenge for commissioners in respect
of payment by results is that the combination of
patients having free choice of provider and a
policy of PCTs having to reimburse ‘any willing
provider’ means that commissioners find
themselves passively reimbursing hospitals 
for elective activity. As noted earlier in this report,
PCTs have few levers with which to control
volume, other than through referral management.
Such issues with the inpatient tariff and absence
of community tariff are compounded by
contractual complexities. Although PCTs
theoretically have the power to decommission
services and shift activity to alternative 
providers, the reality is quite complex. A survey
by the Health Service Journal in 2007 revealed 
that the majority of PCTs had failed to
decommission any services (Crump, 2008).
A discussion paper by the NHS Confederation
suggests that when a service is decommissioned
there is a tendency for activity to increase 
in other services, therefore negating 
any financial benefit of closing the service 
(NHS Confederation, 2009b). If a commissioner
is successful in preventing this displacement 
of activity, the viability of the provider 
may be threatened and this may have 
implications for other services they are 
providing. There is obviously a need for
alternative services to be put in place to replace
those being decommissioned, but given 
the need for PCTs to break-even on an annual
cycle and restricted access to capital investment,
they have relatively little scope for making large
commissioning/decommissioning decisions 
(NHS Confederation, 2009b). 
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PCTs have been much criticised for an alleged lack
of effective commissioning and failure to bring
about significant change to patterns of service
delivery, particularly in the acute sector and
intermediate care. It could be argued that these
accusations have been too harsh and that the
achievements of PCTs, such as ensuring significant
reductions in waiting times for treatment,1
establishing clinical governance structures and
processes to assure quality and safety (National
Audit Office, 2007), putting in place new providers
such as GP-led primary care centres, and bringing
about financial balance following a period of
significant deficit2 have been under-represented.
PCTs have developed extensive local public health
improvement plans (along with their local authority
partners) and implemented numerous national
strategies for different services and client groups.
Practice-based commissioning, as with its
predecessor primary care-led commissioning,
seems to be effective in developing extended
primary care (Smith and Goodwin, 2006;
Coleman and others, 2009), and the creation of
local GP consortia provides a platform upon
which the next phase of clinical commissioning
and provision can be built. 
Achievements have not been championed
enough, especially given the widespread
disruption of reorganisation of PCTs in 2002 
and 2006. As noted earlier, world class
commissioning results have exceeded
expectations with far more PCTs gaining ‘level 3’
than expected, and recent research suggests that
the English NHS is more productive than its
equivalents in the other three UK nations
(Connolly and others, 2010).
But while acknowledging there has been progress
(much of it arguably a result of national guidance
and targets, rather than local commissioning), it is
difficult not to agree with a verdict made jointly
by the Audit Commission and Healthcare
Commission in 2008:
Despite the intention to move care out of hospitals
and into a primary or community care setting,
limited progress appears to have been made.
Commissioning and contracting skills are not yet
strong enough to drive this agenda, although some
PCTs can point to successes [...] The incentives and
infrastructure to support PBC [practice-based
commissioning] are not currently sufficient to
engage most GPs in commissioning.
(p5)
As the economic downturn feeds through to 
the NHS and the challenges posed by patients
with long-term conditions continue to mount, 
5. THE VERDICT ON COMMISSIONING TO DATE
1. The latest waiting times date, release September 2009 showed
that 93.6% of admitted patients and 97.7% of non-admitted
patients completed their referral to treatment pathway within 
18 weeks: http://nds.coi.gov.uk/clientmicrosite/Content/
Detail.aspx?ClientId=46&NewsAreaId=2&ReleaseID=406722&S
ubjectId=36 
2. Audit Commission, Financial Management in the NHS 2007/8.
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it is critical that PCTs and practice-based
commissioners are in a position to make bold 
and radical decisions. In particular, what is
needed is a reorientation of services towards care 
at home or in the community, care that is 
person-centred, seamless and ‘integrated’, and
high-quality (Department of Health, 2006). In
tandem with this, PCTs will need to work with
providers to determine the future pattern and
shape of services in hospitals, examining what can
be decommissioned and re-commissioned in a
way that assures quality and extracts economic
value for the taxpayer.
It is difficult to see how this can happen without
three main factors: 
 A significant prompt towards care being
orientated towards the needs of patients –
whether this is enacted through encouraging
competition for patients by commissioners and
providers, regulation, new forms of local
accountability, personal budgets, central
command, or another set of incentives,
financial or otherwise. 
 Significant encouragement for clinicians – in
particular doctors, who are responsible for most
healthcare expenditure decisions – to take
leadership responsibility in managing resources
and extracting more value from them. 
 A huge advance in the exploitation of 
patient-level information on costs, quality and
use, to provide clinical leaders and patients
with the tools to make better decisions.
The next chapter examines what needs to be done
to address the problems currently associated with
NHS commissioning. The factors associated with
PCT and practice-based commissioning are
examined, along with features of the wider health
system, for it is all too easy to blame
commissioning for lack of progress when other
aspects of the wider system reform physiology
have impeded overall improvement.
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The problems identified above are not simply
going to go away with time. The recent attempt 
at reinvigorating practice-based commissioning
may have gone some way to reawakening the
dying embers of interest in it but, without a 
more radical rethink of the way the NHS
commissioning system is currently organised, 
it is not sufficient to tackle the key problems.
Although it is likely that providers will always
have the upper hand due to information
asymmetry, institutional power and clinical
leadership, it is essential that this upper hand is
somehow mitigated by effective clinically-led
commissioning, especially given the 
forthcoming financial and health challenges 
facing the NHS. 
The potential solutions can be divided into two
sections: those concerned with addressing
problems related directly to PCTs and 
practice-based commissioning policy; and those
that are connected with the wider features of the
NHS in England. 
Where ‘extended practice-based commissioners’
are referred to, this includes entities that are
elsewhere described as integrated care
organisations, multi-specialty groups, local
clinical partnerships, accountable care
organisations and provider–commissioners.
Addressing problems related
directly to policy
Incentivising GPs beyond practice-based
commissioning 
What needs to happen in order for GPs to feel
that it is worth their while to get involved in
service planning and development in the way 
that many did through GP fundholding, 
locality commissioning and total purchasing
during the 1990s? 
Practice-based commissioning practices or
consortia could be granted real risk-adjusted
budgets for certain or all elements of their activity,
with the promise to keep savings to invest in
patient care – as explored in a recent Nuffield
Trust and NHS Alliance report (Smith and others,
2009). Much like the idea of ‘accountable care
organisations’ set out by Fisher and others (2007)
in the United States, doing so would align financial
risks with potential gains, providing a clear
incentive for GPs and other clinicians. Extended
practice-based commissioners would, therefore,
take responsibility for the health outcomes of their
registered population and would assume proper
control of the service planning, development and
commissioning process. 
The Department of Health funded analysis to
develop a person-based risk-adjusted capitation
formula as a basis to set budgets for practices to
commission hospital and community health
services (Dixon and others, forthcoming). Such 
a formula is now being used to set budgets for
6. WHAT NEEDS TO BE DONE? 
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commissioning practices across England from 
1 April 2010. The analysis shows that for the first
time an empirical basis can be used to decide
what population size is necessary for
commissioners to cover and take on an
appropriate level of financial risk – thus 
allowing ‘hard’ budgets to be taken by extended
practice-based commissioners without undue
risk, and appropriate risk-sharing arrangements 
to be made with the PCT, consortia of 
practice-based commissioners, or indeed the
strategic health authority. 
Whether or not the allocation of a ‘hard’ budget 
to practice-based commissioners would be
sufficient incentive to engage GPs in
commissioning in an active manner is open to
question. Evidence from the past (Goodwin,
1998; Croxson and others, 2001; Mays and
others, 2001; Smith and others, 2004) suggests
that some direct personal financial incentive is
likely to be needed, for example, allowing
practice-based commissioning groups to 
re-route funds from the budget for hospital 
and community services to primary care. This
was controversial in the 1990s because of
potential conflicts of interest, and there would
need to be stricter scrutiny of the appropriateness
of this than was present then. The issue of
incentives for clinical commissioning ‘beyond
practice-based commissioning’ is examined 
in more detail in Beyond Practice-based
Commissioning: The local clinical partnership
(Smith and others, 2009).
A less radical solution would be to formalise and
better remunerate clinical involvement in strategic
commissioning. This might entail a contractual
requirement for GP representatives to attend
meetings and contribute to decision-making in
return for a higher level of personal payment. 
The development of practice-based commissioning
compacts (agreements) might go some way to
achieving this, and it is essential that any formal
agreement should tackle the issue of GPs’
provider/commissioner conflicts of interest head
on, enabling agreement of proportionate and
flexible governance processes at a local level. 
This approach would be tentative and in no way
adequate for the future challenges relating to
demands or funding levels.
Providing clinical commissioners with
practical management and strategic support 
Given the undeveloped nature and small scale 
of practice-based commissioners, it is unlikely
that many would have adequate infrastructure,
skills, or even purchasing power (depending on
size of population covered) to make the required
impact on patient care. This support (initially, at
least) must be given by the local PCT, which,
ultimately, would serve practice-based
commissioners with management infrastructure 
in a way that creates a meaningful organisation 
for dialogue and collaboration with hospitals and, 
in particular, clinical directorates. The size of
population covered by the practice-based
commissioning group must be large enough 
to take on the financial risk of a ‘hard’ budget 
(as discussed below), as well as have actual
purchasing power if it is to have a reasonable
negotiating position with local hospital providers.
In some areas of the country, PCTs have this 
vision and are actively supporting practice-based
commissioning groups that wish to assume 
greater responsibility and accountability, helping
them to develop into serious entities that could
lever change. 
Engaging hospitals: extending practice-based
commissioning to encompass integrated care
organisations or multi-specialty groups
Practice-based commissioning groups, if
developed along the lines described above, are
likely to have closer contact and collaboration
with doctors and managers in clinical directorates
in hospitals to develop evidence-based care
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pathways, outcome measures, analysis of costs
and potential for efficiencies along care pathways
or across services. This will help develop 
patient-orientated and better integrated or
coordinated care. Collaboration of this nature
between practice-based commissioners and
secondary care clinicians is likely to spawn much
greater attention to information about care
pathways (cost, quality and use by patients and
clinicians), as well as locally crafted financial
incentives to achieve desired objectives.
A step on from this collaboration between
essentially clinical directorates within two separate
organisations (practice-based commissioning/
primary care, and hospital/trust) could be a move
to networks with shared governance, IT
infrastructure and budgets, in a similar way to how
integrated care organisations operate in the US.
Such groups would be effectively ‘delivery systems’
that are at risk for a capitated budget based on the
population covered and are able to commission
services they cannot themselves provide. They
might focus on the delivery of care for a specific
clinical condition such as diabetes, or multiple
conditions to cover the comprehensive care of an
entire local geographical population. This type of
development was envisaged in the Next Stage
Review (Department of Health, 2008b) and termed
integrated care organisation, although in 
a previous Nuffield Trust and NHS Alliance 
report it was described more fully and termed a
‘local clinical partnership’ (Smith and others,
2009). The possible migration path of 
practice-based commissioning towards such
integrated care organisations is discussed in more
detail in the Nuffield Trust/King’s Fund report that
forms the second report in this series (Lewis and
others, 2010).
Whatever the route from practice-based
commissioning towards some form of integrated
care organisation, there is a critical issue to
consider about whether such organisations take
responsibility for assuring an overall ‘medical
home’ (Rosenthal, 2008) for all patients,
coordinating care wherever the patient goes in the
health system, and/or if they focus on a specific
care pathway or client group. In the case of the
latter, the question to be asked is who, within the
overall commissioning continuum, ensures overall
coordination and management of local
commissioning arrangements. Presumably this
falls to the PCT as the local body responsible for
improving health and ensuring service provision.
A new role for larger and fewer PCTs
Any extension to practice-based commissioning,
such as delegating real and risk-adjusted budgets
for the provision and commissioning of care for 
a local population, would have a direct impact 
on the commissioning role of a PCT. If all
practices in a PCT area were part of an extended 
practice-based commissioning or integrated care
organisation, this would fundamentally challenge
the commissioning role of the PCT. Such a
situation would require that the PCT focus on
holding a local or regional network of these new
organisations to account on behalf of the NHS,
and might entail a shift of significant financial,
analytical and other management support from
the PCT into these organisations, at least initially. 
In the longer term, a scenario of extended
practice-based commissioners would probably
lead to fewer and larger PCT/funding bodies that
would focus on priority setting, funding, setting
contracts with these organisations, and holding
them to account for quality, cost and outcomes. It
would also fall to the PCT, as now, to design and
orchestrate the overall local or regional
commissioning continuum/matrix, ensuring that
services were commissioned at the appropriate
level by the right organisation, and holding the
different elements of the continuum to account
for the outcomes secured, both in relation to
health and value for money. 
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Furthermore, it has to be possible that, over 
time, PCTs will disappear and SHAs (or
something like them) will hold the extended
practice-based commissioners/ICOs to account. 
In turn, this administrative tier would need to be
accountable centrally, perhaps to something like
an independent NHS board. 
However, in a scenario of mixed progress towards
extended practice-based commissioners/ICOs,
PCTs might need to manage a diverse situation of
some devolved and ‘full health accountability’
contracts, alongside PCT responsibility for
commissioning where practice-based
commissioning was less developed or lacked the
willingness/capacity to take on an extended role.
Whether PCTs would handle this by doing such
commissioning themselves, or by tendering for
other organisations (for example, neighbouring
extended practice-based commissioners,
integrated care organisations, or private suppliers)
to perform such a role, is open to question.
Any move to larger PCTs would have a potentially
adverse impact on the links between health and
local government at a city/county level: links
which enable significant joint working and
commissioning of care that seeks to address the
needs of often marginalised groups of the
population (people with learning disabilities,
older people, services for those with mental
health problems, for example). Practice-based
commissioning does not have a track record of
engaging in this joint provision and
commissioning with local authorities, so with any
development of ‘full health accountability’ ICOs
would need to explore how such joint work could
be sustained and further developed.
Assuring legitimacy for commissioners
A fundamental challenge noted above is how to
ensure that care is more firmly directed towards
the concerns of users or potential users, rather
than providers or commissioners. One relevant
aspect is how to increase the local accountability
and therefore the public legitimacy of
commissioners, whether they are PCTs, 
practice-based commissioning groups as now, or
extended practice-based commissioners/ICOs.
This will be increasingly important for the tough
resource allocation and commissioning decisions
that lie ahead. 
There are a number of options for boosting local
accountability of PCTs (Glasby and others,
forthcoming) – for example, moving NHS
purchasing into local government, or having
elected health boards/PCTs (as suggested by the
Liberal Democrats). Another route might be to
extend foundation trust status to commissioning
organisations, requiring them to develop a group
of members who have a say in how the
organisation is run. This would at least put them
on a level playing field with their provider
counterparts, enabling them to behave more like 
a business – retaining savings, investing to save
and so on. It would also go some way towards
raising the profile and status of PCTs, and
practice-based commissioners (and their
extended/ICO successors) in communities and
regions, offering local populations an opportunity
to hold a stake in the decision-making of local
health funders and planners and giving
commissioners greater legitimacy for decisions
about funding priorities.
However, since over 50 per cent of provider trusts
are now foundation trusts and, therefore, not
subject to performance management by SHAs,
PCTs are the main local NHS organisations that in
theory at least the Department of Health can
influence through directives. Given the financial
challenges ahead, it seems unlikely that the
Department of Health would allow this line of
influence to PCTs to be cut, unless there was an
organisation as effective as Monitor as a regulator
of PCTs, or there was another route to more
accountability to the populations PCTs serve. One
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such route might be to allow patients to choose
their commissioner. This is discussed in more detail
in the second report in this series, which explores
the potential of ICOs to compete for patients within
an NHS market (Lewis and others, 2010).
Allowing commissioners more 
financial flexibility 
PCTs and practice-based commissioners would
clearly benefit from having a greater degree of
bargaining power with providers at the
negotiation table. The complexities of
decommissioning services as described above
make it difficult for commissioners to register
their satisfaction, or otherwise, with any given
service through shifts in activity (NHS
Confederation, 2009b). While foundation trusts 
are able to act as businesses, making medium- to
long-term investment and disinvestment
decisions, PCTs and practice-based
commissioners are limited by the resource
accounting and budgeting rules and therefore 
less able to shift resource across different years in
ways that may have longer-term benefits.
Allowing PCTs or extended practice-based
commissioners to operate more like businesses 
(or foundation trusts) by phasing financial
commitments across more than one year would
enable them to more easily exercise market forces
and therefore help them to stimulate the market –
a key competency that remains in the world class
commissioning framework. 
Addressing problems related 
to the wider features of the
English NHS
Reforming payment by results
Associated with the inflexibility of contracts
between PCTs and providers is the structure of
the payment by results tariff. At present, there is 
a need for tariffs to be unbundled to enable
practice-based and PCT commissioners to select
the elements of the service they wish to alter,
either by shifting activity away from an existing
provider, taking on the provision themselves, or
rebundling elements of service to form a new care
pathway to be commissioned. Current payment
by results bundles make it extremely difficult for 
a PCT to estimate the cost of one part of a
procedure that a practice-based commissioner, or
indeed the PCT, may wish to re-provide. 
Although the need for changes to the tariff has
been recognised by policy-makers (Department of
Health, 2009b) and some unbundling has
occurred at a national level, this has not yet
happened for many activities/treatments, and the
tariff still does not apply to many community
health services. While the onus is on local health
communities to work together to negotiate
reasonable payments for services provided outside
hospital, disagreements over what is a fair level
have delayed the start of some practice-based
commissioning activity (Curry and others 
2008). National policy continues, therefore, to
inhibit PCTs wishing to be more transformative 
in the way that they commission and develop 
new services.
In the medium to longer term, if integrated
commissioner–provider organisations evolve
‘beyond PBC’, taking on a fully capitated budget
on behalf of their registered populations, it may
be that the financial currency is not a national
tariff, but some other locally agreed set of prices.
This would be a major departure of policy, and
might be prompted by the need to make
significant efficiency gains in the next three to 
five years. If such a move did take place, there
would have to be concomitant evolution in
measures of quality, to ensure that price
competition did not occur at the cost of quality.
Measures of quality of care are too undeveloped 
at present to allow this departure from current
policy to happen safely.
36 WHERE NEXT FOR COMMISSIONING IN THE ENGLISH NHS?
Setting funding priorities and direction
In addition to some of the clinician-focused
options for commissioning at a local level, there is
the potential to shift the balance of power further
towards commissioners at a national level. The
Conservatives have proposed an independent
NHS board (Conservative Party, 2009) and there
may be scope in this type of model for a national
commissioning function that would set the 
overall broad framework for PCTs, practice-based
commissioners, or ICOs ‘beyond PBC’, 
including national health outcomes and care
pathways. Given their electoral mandate it is,
arguably, the job of government ministers to set
overall priorities and direction in the NHS. A
move to devolve such a responsibility to an
independent board would represent a new
direction for the NHS, and would highlight the
long-standing tension between having
national/central priorities and locally defined
spending and service plans. In other words, how
far would local ‘full health accountability’ ICOs be
able to determine their own priorities for funding
and services, as opposed to implementing
national directives? 
A national board could play a key role in setting
overall health priorities, determining core 
service standards (to be regulated by the Care
Quality Commission) and deciding on resource
allocation to commissioners (larger PCTs, who
would then contract with providers and
provider–commissioner/integrated care
organisations). Furthermore, the National
Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence
(NICE) might become part of such a national
commissioning and priority-setting body, 
given its central role in determining 
evidence-based guidance for NHS funders and
providers. Critical to an approach with a 
national board and local commissioners/ICOs
would be effective regulation of health
commissioning and its outcomes.
What is clear is that the continuum of
commissioning set out in the analysis of evidence
on commissioning in 2004 (Smith and others,
2004) continues to be relevant in 2010 (see
Figure 1, opposite). Some services, such as 
those for people with long-term conditions, 
are appropriate for local practice-based
commissioners or ICOs, and others for regional 
or national purchasing arrangements. What is
different in the current policy context is that, 
as noted earlier in the discussion on
commissioning arrangements, there are signs 
of a move towards greater use of ‘hybrid’
commissioner–providers (such as ICOs),
especially for community-based and ambulatory
care, and as a way of drawing together the
management of demand with provision of better
integrated care. 
The importance of having rigorous and
transparent processes for deciding what services
are commissioned at what point on the
continuum continues to hold true. It is the job of
PCTs, as local stewards of the population’s health
funding and outcomes, to determine where such
commissioning responsibility should lie, and to
hold to account the practices, local authorities,
ICOs and trusts who assume either provider,
commissioning, or commissioning/providing 
roles on behalf of a local population.
Furthermore, arrangements for local
commissioning have to be put in place by PCTs
alongside the other elements of the overall
commissioning continuum, including
specialised/national and personalised/individual
purchasing of care. As the shape of local clinical
and PCT commissioning changes (and the
organisations evolve towards larger entities), 
there may be implications for how and where 
the commissioning of specialised and 
personalised services takes place, and how 
such commissioning is governed. What is 
clear is that the commissioning map will 
continue to be complex and subject to regular
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adjustment and review, to ensure that each health
economy has robust and appropriate
arrangements for the planning, funding and
procurement of care.
Creating a compelling narrative for the
public and the NHS about commissioning
Commissioning remains a mystery to most of the
population, representing as it does a function in
the NHS that would more commonly be
considered as ‘funding and planning’. It is clear
from the analysis made in this report that the
elements of commissioning as understood in the
NHS (needs assessment, priority setting, service
specification, procurement, monitoring and
review) will be ever more critical in the
forthcoming severely constrained financial
context. Indeed, in such a scenario, bringing
commissioning ‘out into the open’ – helping
people to know who is responsible for 
funding and planning what – is a pressing 
priority in itself.
Creating a clear and understandable account of
the role and responsibilities of NHS
commissioners requires that this is first of all
clarified, negotiated and validated within the NHS
policy and management community. Given the
analysis set out in this report – which articulates
the nature of the current ‘commissioning problem’
and what needs to happen if that is to be resolved
– it is clear that the NHS is at a key point in time 
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where policy-makers need to determine ‘where
next’ for health commissioning, and then set out
how this will work and who will be responsible
for what. Only if this happens will a compelling
narrative about the role, potential and
importance of commissioning be created for the
NHS and the population in general. This is
critical if we are to move beyond the current
(arguably unfair) narrative of commissioning as
inevitably and seemingly irrevocably weak, a 
narrative that often conveniently blames
commissioning for wider constraints in the
overall system reform physiology.
The next chapter sets out to answer the question
‘Where next for NHS commissioning?’, drawing
on the analysis made in this report of the evidence
and experience of this function in the NHS and
based on the authors’ reading of likely policy
direction for the next phase.
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The fork in the road
NHS commissioning has not yet lived up to
expectations, albeit that it is sometimes castigated
for failings that are more to do with other
elements of system reform, such as some of the
vagaries of payment by results. PCTs appear to
struggle to make significant strategic changes to
health services, and in particular to secondary 
and tertiary provision. Practice-based
commissioning is at best weak in terms of its
ability to engage clinicians in managing services
and resources. Perennial attempts to boost
commissioning in its influence over service
provision looks increasingly tired and possibly
futile within the current NHS context.
NHS commissioning may have reached a fork in
the road. One direction points towards limping
on in much the same mode as it has for the last
20 years, with incremental change to policy such
as changes to payment by results, offering
stronger incentives for GPs to engage in 
practice-based commissioning and investing
further in developing skills and information 
for commissioners. 
A new and more radical approach to local
clinical commissioning
Another direction points to the need to take far
more decisive steps to energise the
practice/locality part of the commissioning
continuum and encourage groups of clinicians –
those responsible for providing the bulk of quality
and costs – to assume resource management
responsibility together with accountability for 
the health outcomes of a population. This should
be rooted in a population approach to care that 
is oriented towards primary care and a 
registered population. 
The suggested approach to this was set out in the
Nuffield Trust/NHS Alliance report Beyond
Practice-based Commissioning: The local clinical
partnership (Smith and others, 2009). Critical to
this is the engagement of hospital clinicians and
managers in new forms of provider–commissioner
organisations; this will not happen without the
crafting of an appropriate set of incentives, and
careful consideration of what level of risk is
appropriate for ‘beyond PBC’ organisations to bear.
What is clear is that for ‘beyond practice-based
commissioning’ to come into being, GP groups
need more management support, infrastructure
such as information and data analysis, and
incentives to develop and engage clinicians in the
community and increasingly in clinical
directorates currently located in hospitals. PCTs
(and perhaps also trusts, especially as groups
become increasingly multi-specialty) should be
providing this support and should be encouraged
to do so by SHAs and, ultimately, the Department
of Health, although the practicality of achieving
this will be extremely challenging, given recent
exhortations to the NHS to reduce expenditure on
management by 30 per cent (Department of
Health, 2009b). 
While there is no one model of development of
local clinical commissioning for the future, and
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the guiding principles should be diversity and
evolution, the form of the next generation of
practice-based commissioning or integrated care
organisations will be shaped by practical matters
such as the population needed for these groups to
assume financial risk of the budget, as well as the
size needed to attract relevant skills and
infrastructure within what will be increasingly
constrained resources for management.
A new role for fewer PCTs
What is needed is a reshaping of the PCT role
away from one that seeks to do most of the
activities of commissioning, to one where their
primary role is to design, develop, monitor and
adjust the overall commissioning continuum for 
a given locality or region. In the short to medium
term, PCTs will need to help give birth to, and
nurture, extended practice-based commissioning
or integrated care organisations of one form or
another (Lewis and others, 2010) as appropriate
to the service and local context. In this scenario, 
if local clinicians were not keen to move into 
such organisations, the PCT might contract 
with another organisation to fulfil such a role, 
as part of its role in assuring an overall effective
set of commissioning arrangements for the 
local population. 
This approach points to the likelihood of needing
fewer and larger PCTs/funding bodies that would
focus on specialised service commissioning
(moving further towards the right-hand or
national end of the commissioning continuum),
and on contracting with, and holding to account,
practice-based commissioners or integrated care
organisations. Critical to such a PCT/funder role
would be strong and clear regulation of this
commissioning activity (presumably by the Care
Quality Commission and local health scrutiny
bodies measuring the performance of PCTs as
they delegate and manage health commissioning
by local clinician-led organisations). 
More accountability for commissioners
Commissioning organisations, at all levels, need
to become more accountable for commissioning
functions and outcomes. This might be achieved
by one or more different routes, including: 
 much more robust clinical commissioning
‘beyond PBC’
 stronger regulation of commissioning
 enabling the public to choose their
commissioner (in a similar manner to how the
Dutch now choose their public health insurer)
 or by increasing local democratic 
accountability.
Choice of commissioner might be achieved
through patients being able to select their PCT as
well as their extended practice-based
commissioning or integrated care organisation
with which they were registered. Ability to choose
between commissioners would be a very
significant move for health policy in England, and
would have far-reaching implications for the NHS,
for example, the need to define an explicit benefit
package that is funded by the NHS, as well as
sophisticated risk adjustment to set accurate
capitated funding for commissioners, and better
regulation of quality of care and assessment of
patient experience than is possible at present.
More integration of commissioning 
and provision
In this way, NHS commissioning would transcend
the ‘twin-track’ of patient- and population-based
approaches for local commissioning identified in
the 1990s and again in the 2000s, and bring into
being a new generation of hybrid organisations
with greater responsibility for financial and health
outcomes, this time hybrid not only for their
population and patient focus, but also for their
integrated purchaser/provider role. This might in
itself help to rectify the persistent imbalance of
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power between commissioners and providers,
harnessing much greater clinical leadership and
ownership of the organisations taking the key
‘make or buy’ decisions about healthcare and
hence resources. 
The ways in which the NHS practice-based
commissioners might migrate towards such a
model are explored in more detail in the Nuffield
Trust/NHS Alliance report Beyond Practice-based
Commissioning (Smith and others, 2009). The
deeper implications of what it might mean to have
multiple and possibly competing extended
practice-based commissioning or integrated care
organisations is examined in The King’s Fund and
Nuffield Trust report Where Next for Integrated
Care Organisations in the English NHS? (Lewis and
others, 2010).
Assuring an effective continuum of
commissioning
To make a reality of the more radical and hopeful
prognosis for NHS commissioning, PCTs will
need to increasingly reinvent themselves as the
designer, resource allocator and performance
manager of a local or regional health system,
rather than necessarily doing the actual
commissioning in terms of aligning
needs/demand and local service provision. For the
wider health system, and those of us who research
and comment on it, the challenge will be to avoid
the temptation of getting locked into a grand
narrative of ‘weak commissioning’ and to identify
ways of further boosting the effectiveness of
commissioning at all stages along the wider
commissioning continuum. 
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Where next for commissioning in the
English NHS?
Commissioning is an activity that is subject to much
debate in the English NHS. It is often suggested
that if only commissioning were to be ‘strong’ or
‘world class’, much more progress would be made
in areas such as moving care out of hospital into
the community, or gaining greater productivity
from healthcare providers. The theory is that
having commissioners focused on the funding,
planning and purchasing of services will enable
powerful providers to be held to account for the
quality and volume of care delivered, as well as
being challenged to come up with new forms of
care that can replace, rather than simply add to,
current services. As the NHS faces a period of major
financial challenge, the effectiveness of
commissioning is a pressing concern. 
In Where next for commissioning in the English
NHS? the authors, who have studied the
development of NHS commissioning for over 
15 years, use research evidence as the basis for
examining current commissioning
arrangements, analysing the nature of the
‘commissioning problem’, and setting out
practical suggestions for how commissioning
might be strengthened to meet the 
challenges ahead.
This report will be of interest to healthcare
policy-makers, senior managers and clinicians,
and others involved in commissioning, as well
as academics and students in the fields of
healthcare and social policy.
